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Abstract 
The article deals with the role that courts, in particular 
Constitutional Courts, play in the enforcement of the composite 
European Constitution, in relation to other actors, ordinary judges 
and legislators, at national level, and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, at supranational level. It is argued that more 
important than determining who is entitled to pronounce the “last 
word” in this complex setting, is to answer the question about who 
has the “first word”. Besides the role that domestic legislators are 
expected to play and that they often fail to fulfil, the article supports 
that Constitutional Courts are in the best position to frame 
constitutionally sensitive questions through the preliminary 
reference mechanism to the Court of Justice in order to let the 
composite European Constitution work properly and to allow 
national constitutional identities to be effectively taken duly into 
account by the Court in Luxembourg. With this regard, the “Taricco 
saga”, with a fruitful interplay between the Italian Constitutional 
Court and the Court of Justice, is illustrative of such a best practice. 
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1. Introduction: when the first word is more important than 
the last one 
The growing interconnection of legal orders in the European 
Union increasingly questioned the existence of the fundamental 
pillars of the modern State.According to some, this phenomenon 
even changedthe nature of the modern State, transforming it into a 
new kind of State, a sort of “Communitarian State” or “Member 
State”1. Regarding the judiciary, the identification of a supreme 
authority within a legal system has been increasingly challenged. 
The ultimate question has usually been framed in terms of the right 
to say the last word. Who has the right to the last word in case of a 
crucial constitutional conflict at European level?  
This crucial question partly reminds of the debate between 
Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, on who the guardian of the 
Constitutionshould be2, and emerges again within the framework 
of new dilemmas in the European legal space: who is entitled to the 
last word between national and supranational judicial institutions? 
What is left to national and EU legislators? Where is the ultimate 
source of constitutional authority? This contribution tries to flip the 
coin and addresses a different question, which may be less 
attractive at a first sight, but more promising in terms of answers: 
who has the right to the first word? What actors are empowered 
with the right of shaping ultimate constitutional conflicts in the first 
instance? The underlying assumption is that some of the traditional 
schemes of the modern State can be hardly applied to the European 
                                                 
1 See, converging on this idea, A. Manzella, Lo Stato “comunitario”, 22 Quad. cost. 
2 (2003), at 273; R. Toniatti, Forma di Stato comunitario, sovranità e principio di 
sovranazionalità: una difficile sintesi, DPCE 3 (2003), at 1552; F. Palermo, La forma di 
Stato dell’Unione europea. Per una teoria costituzionale dell’integrazione sovranazionale 
(2005), espec. 228 ff.; moreover, in the political science literature, see A. Sbragia, 
From ‘Nation-State’ to ‘Member-State’: The Evolution of the European Community, in 
P. M. Luetzeler (ed.), Europe After Maastricht: American and European Perspectives 
(1994), 69 ff., espec. 87, and C. Bickerton, European Integration: From Nation-States 
to Member States (2012), 51 ff. 
2 The debate has been recently reported, in English, by L. Vinx, The Guardian of 
the Constitution. Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the limits of constitutional law 
(2015). 
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Union in the current constitutional dialogue, while it is not clear 
whether there is a Court that has the last word, the one that speaks 
first often plays a crucial role in framing the constitutional 
questions that other courts and, more in general, other institutions, 
will be called to answer.  
In order to address these issues, the contribution starts by 
arguing for the necessity, in a composite European Constitution, of 
having fundamental charters and Courts that do not assume their 
principles and values in an unmitigated way. Likewise, EU Treaties 
and national Constitutions contain some clauses aiming to connect 
the domestic with the supranational legal systems, European and 
national Courts need to be prone to dialogue, not monopolizing the 
constitutional scene. This is confirmed also by the so called “Taricco 
saga”, a recent case of inter-judicial dialogue between Italian Courts 
and the Court of Justice of the EU, which has also confirmed the 
(often overlooked) role pertaining to legislators in the composite 
European Constitution. After re-affirming the need of direct 
channels of communication between different legal orders, the 
conclusion aims at showing the importance of who poses the initial 
question, thus framing the constitutional dialogue in the European 
legal space.  
 
 
2. The reciprocal self-restraint of the European Treaties and 
Member States’ Constitutions 
The composite nature of the European Constitution implies, 
first in the fundamental documents – the European treaties and the 
national Constitutions – and then, above all, in the Courts asked, at 
European and at national level, to interpret their own provisions, 
the ability not to consider the principles and values of which they 
become carriers as absolute.  
In this regard, the European treaties show considerable self-
restraint. On the one hand, incorporating as "general principles" of 
EU law fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and as a 
result of common constitutional traditions (Article 6 (3) TEU, with 
its reference to the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States); on the other, by committing to respect the national identities 
inherent in the "fundamental, political and constitutional structure" 
of each Member State (Article 4 (2) TEU, with its reference to the 
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national constitutional identities)3.In addition to these clauses, 
more general and potentially open to any possible contents, several 
provisions of both the TEU and the TFEU state that through the 
procedures they foresee, some decisions need to be adopted by each 
Member State, “in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements”4. In doing so, they design a series of procedures that 
are regulated by both EU law and national norms and involve both 
EU and national institutions, and could thus be defined as “Euro-
national procedures”5. 
Similarly, and symmetrically, most Member 
States’Constitutions contain the so-called 'European clauses'. 
Namely, constitutional provisions that implicitly or explicitly, 
broadly or in a more specific way, aim at opening the domestic 
constitutional order to norms and principles adopted at European 
level6. 
                                                 
3 On these features see, among many and with different approaches, A. Celotto, 
T. Groppi, Diritto UE e diritto nazionale: primauté vs. controlimiti, in Riv. it. dir. 
pubbl. com. (2004), at. 1309; M. Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: 
Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty, 11 Eur. 
L. J. 3 (2005), at 262; M. Cartabia, “Unità nella diversità”: il rapporto tra la 
Costituzione europea e le Costituzioni nazionali, in G. Morbidelli, F. Donati (eds), Una 
Costituzione per l’Unione Europea (2006), 185 f. 
4 For instance, articles 42(2) (common Union defence policy), 48(4) (ordinary 
revision procedure), 48(6) (simplified revision procedure), 49 (accession 
agreements), 50(1) (withdrawal) and 54 (ratification of the Treaty) TEU; 25 
(additions to European citizenship), 218(8) (mixed agreements), 223(1) (European 
Parliament’s elections), 262 (jurisdiction on intellectual property rights), 311 
(system of own resources), and 357 (ratification of the Treaty) TFEU. 
5 A similar phenomenon has been spotted and analysed in the remit of EU 
administrative law: see, for instance, G. Della Cananea, I procedimenti 
amministrativi composti dell’Unione europea, in F. Bignami, S. Cassese (eds), Il 
procedimento amministrativo nel diritto europeo (2004) 307 f.; G. Mastrodonato, 
Procedimenti amministrativi composti nel diritto comunitario (2008), espec. at 99 ff.; 
C. Eckes, J. Mendes, The right to be heard in composite procedures: Lost in between 
protection, 36 Eur. L. R. (2011), at 651; F. Brito Bastos, Derivative Illegality in 
European Composite Administrative Procedures, 55 Comm. Mkt. L. R. (2018), at 101. 
It still needs to be analysed under the viewpoint of constitutional law, especially 
when it assumes a clearer procedural nature (as a supreme law regulating the 
intersections among the different legal orders on which the political actors 
operate): see A. Manzella, Il parlamento federatore, 22 Quad. Cost. 1 (2002), at 35. 
6 M. Claes, Constitutionalizing Europe at its Source: The “European Clauses” in the 
National Constitutions: Evolution and Typology, 81 Year. Eur. Law 1 (2012); M. 
Claes, Le “clausole europee” nelle costituzioni nazionali, 25 Quad. cost. 2 (2005), at 
283. 
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The existence of clauses of ‘openness’ towards the 
international legal order is an original feature of the Italian and 
German constitutions. Both constitutions contained clauses 
allowing – respectively – ‘limitations’ (Article 11, in 1947) or 
‘transfers’ (Article 24, in 1949) of sovereignty since the beginning, 
and they have been immediately used as ways for European 
Communities law’s entry into national legal orders. The inclusion 
of such clauses looks fully consistent with the lessons driven from 
the authoritarian experiences and from the Second World War. 
The same model was then followed by other Member States, 
like the Netherlands (Article 62 in 1953, now Article 92), 
Luxembourg (Article 49 bis, in 1956), and Denmark (Section 20, in 
1953), with the drafting of general constitutional clauses used as 
mechanisms for acceding to the European integration 
process7.Especially with the Treaty of Maastricht, when the 
constitutional nature and the political effects of the European Union 
were about to become more evident – after having been 
dissimulated for a long time8 – a new series of clauses specifically 
referring to the European Union were inserted in many Member 
States’ constitutions. Their main aim was to ease the adaptation of 
domestic legal orders to some of the provisions included in the 
Treaty of Maastricht, but often also to implement a series of 
conditions and requirements for further openings or adaptations to 
the European integration process9. 
Even in Member States without a codified Constitution, a 
similar constitutional phenomenon takes place. Without 
addressing here all the steps needed for the UK to become a 
member of the European Communities10, it might be sufficient to 
quote the Miller case, in which the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
                                                 
7 M. Claes, Constitutionalizing Europe at its Source, cit. at 6. 
8 This dissimulation was fully consistent with the approach followed among 
others by Jean Monnet, according to whom the best way to conduct the 
integration process was to avoid dramatic (and thus too-evident) spurts, and to 
proceed with the ‘politique des petits pas’. 
9 Along the same line of reasoning, see the analytic examination of the individual 
clauses (updated after the Lisbon Treaty) presented in Annex III of the study 
commissioned by the European Parliament (PE 493.046) and conducted by L. F. 
M. Besselink et al., National Constitutional Avenues for Further EU Integration 
(2014), 263 ff. 
10 See, for instance, using theories of constitutional pluralism, A.L. Young, 
Democratic Dialogue and the Constitution (2017), 276 f. 
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clarified, judging upon the constitutional consequences of the 
Brexit 2016 referendum, that as long as the European Communities 
Act 1972 “remains in force, the EU Treaties, EU legislation and the 
interpretations placed on these instruments by the Court of Justice 
are direct sources of UK law”11. 
Such ‘European clauses’ entrenched in national constitutions 
enable the ‘communication’ between the EU and the domestic legal 
orders and support once more the idea of the existence of a 
composite Constitution12. They operate with mutual reference and 
ensure the openness of both the EU and national legal systems, 
someway acting as ‘valves’: that is, like mechanical switches that 
can raise or lower the amount of (normative) fluid flowing through 
them, making the two legal orders communicate and interact as 
components of a unique whole13. 
 
 
3. The necessary self-restraint of European and national 
Courts and the consequences of the inter-judicial dialogue in the 
EU 
In the same way, when you consider the legal interpreters’ 
viewpoint, and therefore the viewpoint of the European and 
national Courts, they must evidently be aware of the fact that they 
are not alone, and must not monopolize the scene. They are 
therefore required to show strong self-restraint. Moreover, to 
continue using the abused and discussed, although effective, 
metaphor of dialogue14, it is clear that if one never stops talking, or 
                                                 
11 See par. 61 of the judgment: United Kingdom Supreme Court, Miller & Anor, 
R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Rev 
3) [2017] UKSC 5 (24 January 2017), available 
at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2017/5.html. 
12 L. F. M. Besselink, A Composite European Constitution (2007), at 15-20. 
13 M. Avbelj, Supremacy or Primacy of EU Law-(Why) Does it Matter?, 17 Eur. L.J. 6 
(2011), at 744 reconstructs the mutual relationship between national and 
European law as ‘heterarchical’ and thus to be reciprocally coordinated rather 
than considered one subordinated to the other. 
14 In this special issue see the contributions by D. Paris, Limiting the ‘Counter-
Limits’. National Constitutional Courts and the Scope of the Primacy of EU Law; A-O. 
Cozzi, The Implicit Cooperation between the Strasbourg Court and Constitutional 
Courts: A Silent Unity?; A. Edenharter, Fundamental Rights Protection in the EU: The 
ECJ’s Difficult Mission to Strike a Balance Between Uniformity and Diversity; G. 
Zaccaroni, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: National constitutional judges and the EU 
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if is convinced that he or she is the only one entitled to speak, no 
dialogue whatsoever can ever be established. 
Inter-judicial dialogue in Europe is often depicted as a 
struggle among judges of different and intertwined legal orders, 
about which judge should have the “final word” or the “final say” 
on the interpretation of a certain legal provision15. This assumes 
that each one of the many Courts currently coexisting in Europe 
would aim at playing, in the European legal space, the role 
normally assigned, within the judiciary of each nation-state, to 
Supreme Courts or Courts of Cassation: that is, to solve judicial 
controversies on the interpretation of a certain legal provision, 
deciding upon appeal on the case-law previously decided by 
(lower) Courts, therefore stating what the law is. We could even say 
that every judge would love to play the role famously depicted by 
US Supreme Court justice Robert H. Jackson: “we are not final 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final”16. 
Indeed, in the inter-judicial dialogue that takes place within 
Europe, it is questionable whether the last word really is the most 
important. As no Court is going to play a role similar to the role of 
Supreme Courts or Courts of Cassation, the struggle for the “final 
word”, as appealing as this role could look like, would not make 
much sense. On the contrary, given the composite and constantly 
evolving nature of the European Constitution, with a high level of 
social and legal pluralism, it is likely that often there will be no 
proper “final” decision17. 
                                                 
Constitutional Identity; C. Tovo, Constitutionalizing the European Court of Justice? 
The Role of Structural and Procedural Reforms. 
15 See, among many, M.R. Ferrarese, Dal "verbo" legislativo a chi dice "l'ultima 
parola", 63 Annuario di diritto comparato e di studi legislativi (2011), espec. at 78 
ff. 
16 US Supreme Court, judgment Brown v. Allen (344 US 443, 1953). As it has been 
remarked – by S. Cassese, Fine della solitudine delle corti costituzionali, ovvero il 
dilemma del porcospino, 149 Acc. Sc. Torino Atti Sc. Mor. 15 (2015), available at 
https://www.accademiadellescienze.it/media/1126, at 16 f. – justice Jackson’s 
sentence assumes the existence of a superior Court, considering absolutely 
normal that when it exists, it would revert a significant percentage of previous 
judges’ decisions. 
17 See in particular M. Kumm, Who is the final arbiter of constitutionality in Europe?: 
Three conceptions of the relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court 
and the European Court of Justice, 36 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 2 (1999), at 351 (arguing that 
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As Courts are called – similarly to the Constitutions they are 
required to apply – to move with a strong sense of self-restraint, it 
often happens that the “first word” becomes more important than 
the “final word”. Self-restraint, indeed, is an essential feature of 
good judges, in any case, especially of judges that in the past have 
played a crucial role in setting up the pillars of a certain legal order. 
In the current European Union context, a mention of some 
constitutional theories referred to the US Supreme Court, the so-
called judicial minimalism, could be extremely useful: judges 
should say “no more than necessary to justify an outcome […] 
leaving as much as possible undecided”18. 
All this helps to explain why, in the European inter-judicial 
dialogue, a crucial role is eventually assigned to the Court that 
speaks first, not to the one that speaks last: the authority that first 
submits a legal challenge inevitably takes the centre stage and may 
affect to a significant extent the resolution of a judicial dispute and 
the prevailing interpretation of the legal provisions at stake. 
This also implies, a bit paradoxically according to the 
traditional standards, some kind of reward – in terms of visibility 
and reputation – to the judge who is not afraid to appear humble19 
and decides in particular to ask a preliminary question to the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, rather than to the judge who 
thinks to play its role alone, without involving other judges or, 
more generally, other actors. To put it differently, a referring judge 
who does not isolate itself claiming its supreme judicial authority 
may have a much stronger impact in shaping the European legal 
                                                 
“within a pluralist framework, it does not make sense to speak of a final arbiter 
of constitutionality in Europe”). 
18 See C.R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 
(1999), at 3 f. 
19 On the need for a constitutional judge to adopt a humble approach, see the 
interview to judge Silvana Sciarra, in this special issue (also connected with the 
need to build consensus within a collegial body). For an overview of the different 
approaches that constitutional judges (and interpreters, more in general) can 
embody see C. R. Sunstein, Constitutional Personae (2015). 
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discourse20. Within this picture, judicial humbleness might prove to 
be a much more effective attitude than judicial pride21. 
As judge Giuliano Amato notes in his interview, many 
famous decisions by Constitutional Courts relating to European 
integration “were actually postponing a final word on the case”.  
 
 
4. The (good) example of the Italian Constitutional Court 
in the “Taricco saga” 
In their interviews included in this special issue, all the four 
judges of the Italian Constitutional Court quoted the “Taricco 
saga”, and more precisely order no. 24/2017 through which the 
Court they are members of referred a preliminary ruling to the 
Court of Justice22. 
Indeed the “Taricco saga” offers a perfect example of how 
inter-judicial dialogue could work and, thanks to the self-restraint 
of the Italian Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the 
EU, helpedto solve issues that could potentially create clashes and 
conflicts. As judge Amato remarked, the Taricco saga is an example 
of the fact that “there is no exclusive primacy in the interplay 
between national and European levels” and a further confirmation 
that “we are living in times of ‘constitutional duplicity’ and the 
specific task of each constitutional judge is to contribute to the 
dialogue among legal culture and legal charters”. It is thus useful 
to look a bit more into this case, to show the reasons why the 
                                                 
20 For a comparative picture of the different paths followed by the Constitutional 
Courts of EU Member States and the difficulties they have met see The Preliminary 
Reference to the Court of Justice of The European Union by Constitutional Courts, 
edited by M. Dicosola, C. Fasone, and I. Spigno, special issue of 16 Ger. L. J. 6 
(2015). 
21 On the many reasons that justify the reluctance of the Constitutional Courts to 
use the preliminary reference procedure and to “engage in a formal dialogue” 
with the European Court of Justice see M. Claes, Luxembourg, Here We Come? 
Constitutional Courts and the Preliminary Reference Procedure, 16 Ger. L. J. 6 (2015), 
at 1331 (noting that some explanations have been found in legal arguments, 
others in behavioural factors). 
22 Italian Constitutional Court, Order no. 24/2017 of 23 November 2016, 
published in the Italian Official Journal, G.U of 1 February 2017. For a multi-
disciplinary debate on it see A. Bernardi and C. Cupelli (eds.), Il caso Taricco e il 
dialogo tra le Corti. L’ordinanza 24/2017 della Corte costituzionale (2017). 
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approach of the Italian Constitutional Court could be considered a 
good example. 
The Constitutional Court, in its order no. 24/2017, rightly 
avoided following the tempting path of affirming a priori and in 
absolute terms a yet fundamental constitutional principle, the 
principle of legality in criminal matters, as a "counter-limit" to 
assert with respect to EU law.23 Instead, the Court preferred to ask 
the Court of Justice for a reassessment, especially in the light of a 
more careful consideration of the characteristics of the Italian 
constitutional system, of its own ruling on the "Taricco case". It thus 
demonstrated a will to face a difficult issue through a preliminary 
reference to the Luxembourg Court, a channel which the same 
Court had (a little too late) used, in the case of incidental 
proceedings, with order no. 207/201324. 
Similarly, in the M.A.S. judgement, the Court of Justice has 
carefully avoided abiding by the uncompromising and self-
centered reading of the European Union's legal order proposed by 
Advocate General Bot25.In fact, in his conclusions, the Advocate 
General essentially denied the possibility of the Constitutional 
Court identifying the rights that make up the Italian constitutional 
identity pursuant to art. 4, par. 2, TEU and claimed that this task 
was instead a responsibility of the Court of Justice. Clearly, the 
acceptance of this interpretive approach on art. 4, par. 2, TEU would 
have meant disregarding the interpretation of this provision as a 
“valve clause”, by which the European Union legal order limits 
itself in favour of the legal order of the Member States, in as much 
as constitutional identity profiles are at stake. It would even have 
turned it into a sort of an “aggressive clause”, through which the 
Court of Justice could identify from above the elements making up 
the constitutional identity of each Member State, at least with 
                                                 
23See, among many, M. Luciani, Il brusco risveglio. i controlimiti e la fine mancata 
della storia costituzionale, 2 Riv. AIC, www.rivistaaic.it, and C. Cupelli, Il caso 
Taricco e il controlimite della riserva di legge in materia penale, in A. Bernardi (ed.), I 
controlimiti. Primato delle norme europee e difesa delle norme costituzionali (2017) 331. 
24 Cf. G. Repetto, Pouring New Wine into New Bottles? The Preliminary Reference to 
the CJEU by the Italian Constitutional Court, 16 Ger. L. J. 6 (2015), at 1449. 
25 See Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber), case C-42/17, 
M.A.S., 5 December 2017, and the Conclusion of the Advocate General Bot 
delivered on 18 July 2017. 
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regard to the identity elements that the Union is obliged to respect 
and therefore able to limit the primacy of the Union law26. 
 On the contrary, the Court of Justice, with a very reasonable 
motivation managed to circumvent the main obstacles, the most 
difficult of which was certainly that of the "counter-limits" raised 
with the third question posed by the Constitutional Court and has 
partiallyre-evaluated its previously provided interpretation. In 
particular, as rightly noted27, the Court of Justice has dropped the 
conflict on constitutional identity as an element that differentiates 
one order from another (the "constitutional identity as difference") 
and has instead recovered the shared dimension of the European 
constitutional heritage, insisting on the principle of determination 
of criminal cases, and, anyway, focussing on European standards, 
rather than on the typical characteristics of the Italian legal order. 
 
 
5. There are legislators, too 
Another general indication that can be drawn from the 
“Taricco saga”, being coherent with the minimalist doctrine, 
consists in providing the umpteenth confirmation of an element 
that should be granted, but is not: that is, that the protection of 
fundamental rights does not belong exclusively to judges, be they 
national or European, but also requires an essential contribution 
from the legislator. The definition and shaping of the main features 
of the composite European constitution are not a task only 
forCourts.  
The fact that, historically, the role played by the Court of 
Justice and by some Constitutional Courts has been absolutely 
                                                 
26Critically, on the conclusions of the Advocate General, see L. Daniele, Il seguito 
del caso Taricco: l’Avvocato generale Bot non apre al dialogo tra Corti, 2 European 
Papers 3 (2017), at 987, www.europeanpapers.eu, espec. 999 f. On the different 
interpretations of Art. 4, par. 2, TEU, see, among many, B. Guastaferro, Beyond 
the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the Identity 
Clause, 31 Year. Eur. L. 1 (2012), at 263; F. Xavier-Millet, L’Union européenne et 
l'identitéconstitutionnelle des Étatsmembres (2013); E. Cloots, National Identity in EU 
Law (2015); G. Di Federico, L’identità costituzionale degli stati membri nel diritto 
dell’Unione europea. Natura e portata dell’art. 4, par. 2, TUE (2017); J. Sterck, Sameness 
and selfhood: The efficiency of constitutional identities in EU law, (early view) Eur. L. 
J. (2018). 
27 P. Faraguna, Constitutional Identity in the EU. A Shield or a Sword?, 18 Ger. L. J. 
7 (2017), at 1617. 
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crucial does not mean that this judicial activism should be a 
permanent characteristic of the EU legal order. It is true, therefore, 
that the construction of the EU constitutional system has 
traditionally been a matter for Courts, in particular for the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the national Courts entitled to carry 
out constitutional review28. However, this does not mean that the 
main current constitutional issues have to be solved only through 
inter-judicial dialogue. On the contrary, the more the European 
integration process moves forward, addressing to care further 
public aims and dealing with fundamental rights, the higher the 
necessity of a dialogue between the Courts and the many legislators 
acting in the European legal space29, in order to solve the inevitably 
increasing number of constitutional conflicts30, including those 
regarding constitutional identities31. 
The idea –affirmed above all in the United States, but which 
has had considerable success also in the Italian scholarship – 
according to which the protection of fundamental rights is an 
almost exclusive responsibility of judges is currently showing all its 
                                                 
28 C. Fasone, N. Lupo, Constitutional Review and the Powers of National Parliaments 
in EU Affairs. Erosion or Protection?, in D. Jancic (ed.), National Parliaments after the 
Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis. Resilience or Resignation? (2017) 59 ff. On the 
European Court of Justice as “the most effective supranational judicial body in 
the history of the world” see A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe 
(2004), at 1, and, more recently, S. Saurugger, F. Terpan, The Court of Justice of the 
European Union and the Politics of Law (2017), espec. 19 ff. On the role played by 
Constitutional Courts, especially the German and the Italian ones, see M. Kumm, 
The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict, cit. at 3, at 263 and 293-298, J. Komarek, 
The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, 9 EuConst 3 (2013), at 420, M. Dani, 
National Constitutional Courts in supranational litigation. A contextual analysis, 23 
Eur. L.J. 3-4 (2017), at 189. 
29 M. Dawson, Constitutional Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures in the 
European Union: Prospects and Limits, 19 Eur. Pub. L. 2 (2013), at 369, and M. 
Dawson, The Political Face of Judicial Activism: Europe’s Law-Politics Imbalance, in 
M. Dawson, B. De Witte & E. Muir (eds.), Judicial Activism at the European Court of 
Justice (2013), at 11. 
30 G. Martinico, The Tangled Complexity of the EU Constitutional Process. The 
Frustrating Knot of Europe (2013) 117 ff.; M. Dani, Il diritto pubblico europeo nella 
prospettiva dei conflitti (2013) 101 ff.; N. Scicluna, European Union Constitutionalism 
in Crisis (2014) 120 ff. 
31 See P. Faraguna, Taking Constitutional Identities away from the Courts, 41 Brook. 
J. Int'l L. 2, (2016), at 492. 
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downsides and limitations.32 These are particularly evident when 
referred to ordinary judges, therefore deprived – in Italy as in most 
EU Member States, which adopt centralized systems of 
constitutional justice33 – of the possibility of labelling with erga 
omnes effects a law as invalid. However, they also emerged in the 
presence of constitutional judges. In fact, it often happened that 
their intervention was not and could not be sufficient to ensure an 
adequate protection of the infringed fundamental rights.  
It is therefore essential, both from a theoretical and above all 
from a practical point of view, that the legislator does not dismiss 
his role as a subject called to protect and implement fundamental 
rights. Moreover, to do this, as a rule, "in the first instance", leaving 
then to the judges, constitutional or not, the task of evaluating in a 
second phase whether and to what extent the protection guaranteed 
by the legislator proves to be adequate and in line with the 
provisions contained – depending on the specific cases in Court –in 
the ECHR, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights or in the Italian 
Constitution. Of course, if the legislator, as has at times 
unfortunately happened in the Italian case, on the most sensitive 
issues, does not provide any kind of protection, in particular as for 
"new" fundamental rights, then it is inevitable that the space for the 
judiciary, in all its articulations, expands considerably. If anything, 
due to the direct intervention of the judge on matters and rights not 
previously ruled by the legislator, there is an overexposure of the 
judge called to settle issues with strong political and ethical 
implications. 
The “Taricco saga”, after all, originated from, to say the least, 
anunwise and unconscious action by the Italian legislator, as a 
result of a law designed "ad personam” as for its effects, in order to 
affect some ongoing trials against members of the centre-right 
majority supporting the Berlusconi government, yet capable of 
quite profound alterations of the general statute of limitations. In 
fact, law no. 251/2005 (also known as "ex Cirielli"), modified the 
                                                 
32 See the critiques on Dworkin’s theory by R. Bellamy, Ronald Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously, in J.T. Levy (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Contemporary 
Political Theory (2018) forthcoming (available online ahead of print) and J. 
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L. J. 6, (2006), at 
1346. 
33 For a comparative picture see M. De Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe. A 
Comparative Analysis (2014). 
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rules on the statute of limitations in a reductive sense, replacing art. 
157 of the Criminal Code (also with the purpose, as said, to affect 
certain trials in progress, including the IMI-SIR proceeding, which 
saw among the defendants Cesare Previti, at the time member of 
Parliament).  
One of the innovative elements of the M.A.S. ruling with 
respect to the first Taricco judgment by the Court of 
Justice34consists precisely in a clarification of how the obligations 
under art. 325 TFEU refer primarily to the legislator, even before 
the national judge: “It is primarily for the national legislature to lay 
down rules on limitation that enable compliance with the 
obligations under Article 325 TFEU, in the light of the 
considerations set out by the Court in paragraph 58 of the Taricco 
judgement” (M.A.S., paragraph 41). In this light, moreover, the 
Court of Justice can better justify the reference to "a significant 
number of cases of serious VAT fraud", which, as the Constitutional 
Court correctly pointed out, involves a discretionary assessment 
which can hardly be requested to the individual judge, but which 
is completely admissible when, instead, it is addressed to the 
legislator. 
 
 
6. The need for direct channels of communication  
More generally, in the “Taricco saga”, the choice of the 
Constitutional Court was the right one, and fully understandable 
only on the basis of the aforementioned order no. 270/2013, with 
the purpose of overcoming what had long been considered a taboo, 
and to activate a direct confrontation with the Court of Justice, 
through the preliminary reference procedure.  
In this procedure, the way the reference is made to the Court 
of Justice is fundamental, and also to a certain extent, the subject who 
poses it. There is much discussion –even too much – on the "right 
to the last word", but often, in the dialogue between judges, the 
most important thing is having the first word (because it is due, or 
because the right is autonomously taken), so as to correctly define 
the interpretation of the legal provision and ask a question that 
                                                 
34 See Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber), case C-42/17, 
M.A.S., 5 December 2017. On it see, for a first case-note, M. Bassini, O. Pollicino, 
Defusing the Taricco Bomb through Fostering Constitutional Tolerance: All Roads Lead 
to Rome, Verfassungsblog, https://verfassungsblog.de/, 5 December 2017. 
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leads to a certain range of solutions rather than others. Moreover, 
as known and as already noted, in a pluralistic and multi-level 
order, no judge paradoxically takes the real last word, while the 
judge who speaks first has the opportunity to outline legal 
questions, to frame them and, often, to suggest an answer, in its 
own legal order or sometimes even outside of it.  
In this key, specifically and always with reference to the 
“Taricco saga”, it is worth remembering that the question originally 
raised (by the Court of Cuneo) was not properly focused on the core 
question at stake: it referred, in fact, to the interpretation of articles 
101, 107 and 119 TFEU, as well as art. 158 of Council Directive 
2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value 
added tax. Therefore, the Court of Justice, in its first decision, 
reformulated one of the four questions submitted by referring it, 
based on the grounds of the order, to the more general 
compatibility of EU law, thus with art. 325 TFEU (paragraphs 35 to 
37 of the Taricco judgment). The way the first preliminary reference 
was framed did not ease the task of the Court of Justice in delivering 
its first judgment in the “Taricco saga”, in particular for what 
concerns a careful appraisal of the actual implications of that 
judgment in the Italian legal order. 
In this context, it seems to me more than understandable that 
– not by chance, a few days after the M.A.S. ruling by the Court of 
Justice – the Constitutional Court has inserted in the motivation of 
the judgment n. 269 of 2017, a very significant obiter dictum 
(containing references both to the ruling by the Court of Justice and 
the Constitutional Court’s order no. 24/2017, from which the 
former originated), clearly aimed at ensuring its greater 
involvement, compared to the past, in the interpretation and 
implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union35. 
                                                 
35 See the (many) case notes on judgment no. 269/2017, starting from A. Ruggeri, 
Svolta della Consulta sulle questioni di diritto eurounitario assiologicamente pregnanti, 
attratte nell’orbita del sindacato accentrato di costituzionalità, pur se riguardanti norme 
dell’Unione self-executing (a margine di Corte cost. n. 269 del 2017), 3 Riv. dir. 
comp. (2017), A. Guazzarotti, La sentenza n. 269 del 2017: un “atto interruttivo 
dell’usucapione” delle attribuzioni della Corte costituzionale, 38 Quad. cost. 1 (2018), 
at 194, D. Tega, La sentenza n. 269 del 2017: il concorso di rimedi giurisdizionali 
costituzionali ed europei, ivi, 197, G. Scaccia, L’inversione della “doppia pregiudiziale” 
nella sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 269 del 2017: presupposti teorici e problemi 
applicativi, Forum QC, www.forumcostituzionale.it, 25 January 2018. From the 
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So far, in this regard, the most significant role in the 
evaluation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union has been played – in the Italian legal order – by ordinary 
judges. Moreover, the Constitutional Court somehow excluded 
itself from the inter-judicial dialogue in Europe, refusing to go 
through the phase of the preliminary reference to the Court of 
Justice36. Rather, in that phase, the Constitutional Court has 
invitedordinary judges to use the tool of the preliminary reference 
and, in those same years, has also freed itself by declaring 
inadmissible a series of delicate cases concerning the protection of 
fundamental rights. Now, strengthened by the encouraging 
outcome of the “Taricco saga”, the Constitutional Court seems 
willing to participate again in the game and play its legitimate role 
in a system with a centralized constitutional review of legislation. 
It goes without saying that this role will have to be carried out in 
practice, not only in theory, in a balanced and effective way, as it 
happened in the “Taricco saga”; otherwise it risks being placed 
again at the margins of the fundamental rights guarantee circuit in 
Europe. Indeed, if the Constitutional Court asks the right questions 
to the Court of Justice and proposes its interpretations of the Italian 
constitutional identity, the principles and values of the 1948 
Constitution will be likely to find an entry path and protection, in a 
non-absolutisticway, in the composite Constitution of the European 
Union. 
 
 
7. Conclusion. The importance of asking questions: from 
Dworkin’s “father example” to Cartabia’s “mother example” 
Finally, in order to underline, once more, the importance of 
the Court that takes the floor first, asking questions in the right way, 
it could make sense to conclude this contribution by proposing a 
parallel between a well-known example used by Ronald Dworkin 
and a similar one, on the relationship among Courts in Europe, 
more recently put forward by Marta Cartabia. 
                                                 
Constitutional Court’s perspective, see A. Barbera, La Carta dei diritti: per un 
dialogo fra la Corte italiana e la Corte di giustizia, 38 Quad. cost. 38 (2018), at 149. 
Mainly from the perspective of ordinary judges see E. Scoditti, Giudice 
costituzionale e giudice comune di fronte alla carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione 
europea dopo la sentenza costituzionale n. 269 del 2017, 143 Foro it. 2 (2018), at 406. 
36 See G. Repetto, Pouring New Wine into New Bottles?, cit. at 24, at 1449 ff. 
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Ronald Dworkin, to explain how Constitutions should be 
interpreted and, more specifically, the difference between 
(necessarily general) concepts, very frequently employed by the 
Constitutions, and (specific) conceptions, adopted by Courts in 
deciding concrete cases, put forward the so called “father 
example”37. He described the Constitution as a father, addressing 
concepts to his children, and refers to the concept (and conceptions) 
of fairness.  
 “Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect them not to 
treat others unfairly. I no doubt have in mind, or could quickly 
bring to mind, examples of the conduct I mean to discourage, but I 
would not accept that my ’meaning’ was limited to these examples, 
for two reasons. First, I would expect my children to apply my 
instructions to situations I had not and could not have thought 
about. Second, I stand ready to admit that some particular act I had 
thought was fair when I spoke was in fact unfair, or vice versa, if 
one of my children is able to convince me of that later; in that case I 
should want to say that my instructions covered the case he cited, 
not that I had changed my instructions. I might say that I meant the 
family to be guided by the concept of fairness, not by any specific 
conception of fairness I might have had in mind”38. 
From this example, as it is well-known, Dworkin derives a 
criticism towards those who, in the debate on the US Constitution, 
argue that constitutional interpretation should consist in giving 
legal provisions exclusively the meanings that were already 
devised by their drafters39. On the contrary, he maintains that the 
important judgments issued by the Warren Supreme Court in the 
Sixties and in the Seventies have adopted a correct method of 
constitutional interpretation, or, even better, have done exactly 
what Constitutional Courts should do: that is, interpreting concepts 
in a way that offers the “best understanding of concepts embodied 
                                                 
37 An in-depth analysis of this “father example” is offered by S. A. Barber, J. E. 
Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions (2007), 26 ff. 
38 R. Dworkin [1978], Taking Rights Seriously (new edition 1997), 134 ff. (italics in 
the original). 
39 Polemically, Dworkin uses the arguments employed by the then US President 
Nixon when it argued that the good judges would “enforce the law as it is, and 
not ‘twist or bend’ it to suit their personal convictions, as Nixon accused the 
Warren Court of doing” (see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, cit. at 38, 131 
ff.). 
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in the words” of the Constitution (so called philosophic approach 
to Constitutional interpretation). 
A similar role could be played, regarding inter-judicial 
dialogue in the composite European Constitution, by what we 
might call the “mother example”, which was quoted by Marta 
Cartabia in a lecture held at LUISS University some years ago40. The 
aim – fully consistent with what has been argued in this 
contribution – is to demonstrate that sometimes the “first word” 
matters, in such a pluralistic legal space, even more than the “last 
word”.  
The metaphor runs as follow. The preliminary reference 
made by a Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union could be imagined like a child asking a question 
to her or his mother – of course, it could be her or his father too, but 
in this way the parallel with Dworkin’s father example would be 
less evident41 –for instance in order to go out for the evening, or for 
a week-end with her or his friends. It is clear that if the question 
was well formulated and strongly motivated it would have more 
chances to receive a timely and positive answer. 
In the past decades, as already remarked, most national 
Constitutional Courts in Europe never raised a preliminary 
reference42. In some way, they were reluctant even to ask, either for 
                                                 
40 The occasion was the opening lecture on “Courts and Rights in Europe: the 
construction of a legal system with multiple judicial controls” during the second 
week of the second edition of the LUISS School of Government’s Summer 
Program on Parliamentary Democracy in Europe, 15 July 2013. In other 
circumstances judge Cartabia has dealt with the topic in written essays, but she 
has never used the “mother example”. Nor, indeed, did she make any explicit 
spoken parallel with Dworkin’s “father example”. 
41 It should be added that the metaphor must obviously be taken as such, without 
pushing it too far. There is almost no need to recall that most Constitutional 
Courts are often “older” than the Court of Justice and in any case sufficiently 
grown-up to take in full their own responsibility. Consequently, they do not need 
any kind of permission by a “superior” authority. Nevertheless, as Constitutional 
Courts are normally judges of last resort (“against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law)”, they are obliged to bring before the Court 
of Justice questions concerning the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity 
and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
Union, according to Article 267 TFEU. 
42 See M. Dicosola, C. Fasone & I. Spigno, Foreword: Constitutional Courts in the 
European Legal System After the Treaty of Lisbon and the Euro-Crisis, in 16 Ger. L. J. 
6 (2015), at 1318 (remarking that the trend changed in the last decade and the 
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the fear of receiving a negative answer or, more plausibly, merely 
because in asking the question they would have recognised a kind 
of superior or at least an equal authority on constitutional matters 
to the Court of Justice. However, clearly, it is not by avoiding asking 
the question that the authority of the Court of Justice is put in doubt. 
On the contrary, there will be other judges (of the same Member 
State or of other Member States) who will ask the question 
differently, generally without a similar motivation and without the 
sensibility that only a Constitutional Court can have in submitting 
a certain question (bringing, together with it, the constitutional 
culture, values and identity of which the Constitutional Court 
should be the first interpreter). 
If you want to go back to the metaphor, it is as if the question 
to the mother was asked not by her child but by someone else, on 
her or his behalf, of course using different words. None of them 
could clearly have the same sensibility and effectiveness that the 
child can have with her/his parent in asking the same question 
directly. Obviously, the chances of the mother fully understanding 
the question and giving a positive answer decrease significantly, if 
the question is not correctly or convincingly framed. 
 
                                                 
Constitutional Courts of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, 
Spain, Slovenia and Poland have issued preliminary references to the Court of 
Justice). 
